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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

flHP STBIUfflRPS PF RFFEILRTE REV I EN
1.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in

concluding that defendant's felony conviction uia3
admissible;
fl.

Pursuant to rule 609(a)(1), Utah Rules of
Evidence?

Under rule 609(a)(1), a felony conviction may be
admitted to impeach the defendant's testimony only If the
trial court determines that the probative value outweighs
its prejudicial effect.
1334 (Utah 1986).

State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325,

The trial court's weighing of these

factors is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion;
however, "whether a trial judge has exceeded the scope of
the discretion granted to him or her is a legal question"
and reviewed on appeal for correction of error.

State v.

Thurman. 816 P.2d 1256, 1270 n. 11 (Utah 1993) (clarifying
State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991).
6.

Ge3pite Section 76-8-1002(2), Utah Code
Annotated.

The relevant procedure for felony jury trial with an
habitual criminal charge Is as to I lows;

"If a jury is

impaneled, it shall not be told of the previous felony
convictions or charge of being a habitual criminal.
trial on the felony committed

The

ithin the state of Utah

shall proceed as in other cases." Standard of review is
abuss of discretI-n.
1

2.

Did the trial court err in refusing to grant defendant

a mistrial on the ground that Deputy Brewer's testimony was
prejudicial and not cured by the trial court's instruction
to the jury to disregard that testimony?
fl trial court's denial of a motion for listrial will
be upheld unless the court abused its discretion,

To

warrant reuersal defendant must show that testimony is so
prejudicial as to deny him a fair trial. State u. Burk.
839 P.2d 880, 883-84 (Utah flpp. 1992).
3,

Is there sufficient evidence to support defendant's

conviction for theft of an operable motor vehicle?
fl jury verdict is viewed in the light most favorable
to upholding it and will only be reversed where reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted.
State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992); State v.
Jonas. 793 P.2d 902, 903-04 (Utah flpp.), cert denied. 804
P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990); State v. Peters. 796 P.2d 708 (Utah
Rpp. 1990).
CONSTITUTIONAL PR0UISI0HS. STATUTES. RULES
Copies of statutes and rules determinative of this
appeal are contained in the addendum.
STRTEflEHT OF CRSE
fl. Nature of the Case
Defendant Uayne H. Gauger was charged by second
amended information with theft of an operable motor vehicle
in violation of Section 76-6-404, Utah Code Ann. and being
2

an habitual criminal in violation of Section 76-8-1001,
Utah Code Ann. (Record 13-15).

That information specified

as the basi3 for the habitual criminal enhancement, a 1984
Second Degree Felony conviction and commitment for
Possession of a Stolen Uehicle; a 1988 Second Degree Felony
conviction and commitment for Larceny; a 1991 Third Degree
Felony conuiction and commitment for Burglary (R. 13-15).
Defendant plead not guilty on December 8, 1993 and the
matter ma3 set for jury trial.
B.

Course of Proceedings

On January 10, 1994, a jury trial was held in Seventh
District Court with the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson
presiding,

R state witness, Grand County sheriff deputy

Curt Brewer testified that when questioning defendant
subsequent to his arrest, defendant stated he mas on parole
from the Utah State Prison (Transcript 94). Defense counsel
objected, was sustained and the jury told to disregard that
statement (T.94).

Rt the next recess, defense counsel

mowed for a mistrial on the basis of Deputy Bremer's
statement (T.99).
99-100).

The trial judge denied the motion (T,

The trial court offered to and did later giue a

curative instruction to the jury (Instruction Ho. 11, R.
70).
Defendant testified on direct (T. 107-110) and was
cross-examined (T.110-123). During his cross-examination,
defendant was questioned about prior felony convictions
(T.116).

Defense counsel requested a recess and the court
3

made a determination to allow further questioning on one of
defendant's prior convictions (T. 116-122),

The court

ailowed defendant to be questioned about his prior burglary
conviction.
The jury was given eleient instructions on the charged
offense and two lesser included offenses of unlawful
control over a motor vehicle for an extended time and
unlawful control over a motor vehicle (Instruction No. 5-7;
R. 64-66). The jury was given four possible verdict forms.
They could find defendant guilty of either the charged
offense, one of the lesser included offenses or not guilty
of any charge.
C.

Disposition at Trial Court

Defendant was found guilty as charged of theft of an
operable vehicle (R. 86). Defendant then admitted the
habitual criminal allegation (T. 163-70).

Defendant was

referred to Adult Probation and Parole for a presentence
investigation.

On February 16, 1994 defendant was

sentenced to serve an enhanced term in the Utah State
Prison of five years to life (R. 89-91).
D.

Facts

On November 22, 1993 Defendant took unauthorized
possession of an operable vehicle, a red camaro, owned by
Shontee Torres, from her home in floab, Grand County, Utah
(T.108). Ginger Torres (Shontee's mother) testified that
she noticed the vehicl e missing between 7:00 and 7:30 p.m.
that evening (T. 64). Shontee became aware that the vehicle
4

ma3 missing when she came home between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m.
(T. 69). That night defendant used the vehicle to drive to
Grand Junction, Colorado, to help a friend move her
possessions back to floab (T. 94, 108). The next day they
drove back to rtoab and stopped at the local City Market to
pick up some baby food (T. 109). The car was seen there
and reported to the police and soon after reported to be
parked in front a trailer where defendant mas located (T.
103). This occurred at approximately 7:40 p.m. (T. 103).
He had just finished unloading his friend's possessions
from the car (T. 109). Uhen the officers arrived,
defendant was scared and hid under a bed in the back of the
trailer (T. 90). Uhen questioned by officers he admitted
that he had taken the vehicle and that he was just getting
ready to return the car to city park, a public park located
near the owner's residence (T. 85, 95, 107).
SUntlflRV OF flRGUrtEHTS
The trial court erred in admitting the defendant's
prior felony conviction for burglary under Rule 609(a)(1)
by improperly determining that the probative value of the
conviction outweighed its prejudicial effect and not
excluding it as a similar crime. The court also erred in
admitting the conviction under section 76-8-1002 which
prohibits informing the jury of prior convictions that are
the basis for the habitual criminal charge in the
underlying felony trial.

5

The trial court also abused its discretion in failing
to grant a mistrial when a prosecution witness testified
that the defendant was on parole from prison at the time of
his arrest.

This statement especially in light of the

admission of the prior conviction unfairly prejudiced the
jury and denied defendant a fair trial, fls the outcome of
the trial turned on the jury's assessment of defendant's
credibility, absent these errors, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result for defendant.
There is insufficient evidence to support the
defendant's conviction for theft of an operable motor
vehicle, as a reasonable jury should have had a reasonable
doubt as to that charge and found him guilty of the lesser
included charge of unlawful control over a motor vehicle
for an extended t ime.
Defendant's conviction, therefore, should be reversed,
and the case remanded to the district court for new trial
or in the alternative the conviction should be reduced to
unlawful control over motor vehicle for extended time and
the case remanded for resentencing.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error In
Admitting Evidence of Defendant's Prior Felony
Conviction.
fl. Pursuant to Rule 609(a)(1), Utah
Rules of Evidence.
6

Under Utah Rules of Evidence, a felony or misdemeanor
conviction is admissible, if: (1) the conviction involves
dishonesty or false statement; or (2) the conviction is
relevant to proving defendant's intent, motive, plan,
opportunity and lack of mistake or accident.

See Utah R.

Evid. 609(a)(2), 404(b) I 403, respectively.

See Addendum.

Outside these two exceptions, the admission of prior
crimes evidence is presumed prejudicial. State v.
Saunders. 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985).

Houever, Rule

609(a)(1), Utah Rules of Evidence, does permit "an accused
mho testifies in a criminal case on his own behalf: to be
impeached by evidence of his prior felony convictions not
inuoluing dishonesty or false statement if "the (trial)
court determines that the probative value of admitting the
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect." State v.
Banner. 717 P.2d 1325, 1334 (Utah 1986).

In balancing the

evidence's probative value against its prejudicial effect,
the trial court must, at minimum, properly consider the
five pronged Banner analysis.
1.

The Trial Court Improperly Found That
Burglary Has Hot a Similar Crime.

While the trial court did conduct a Banner analysis,
it did not do so correctly.

The court correctly stated the

si milarity prong:
The similarity to the charged crime, 'cause It
bears on the prejudice, the—the rule of thumb is
7

that there would be a rare, rare case when a
crime similar to what's being charged would be
admissible, because it would—in the jury's mind,
it would tend to overshadow everything else,
(T. 119).
Correctly, under the similar crime analysis, the court
then excluded the possession of a 3tolen vehicle and
larceny prior convictions.

However, the court did not

treat the burglary conviction the same way and continued
with further admissibility analysis. The court held that
the burglary conviction is "not similar to the charged
crime.

They're— the jury's not likely to look at It and

say he's committed a burglary before, so therefore, he must
have committed theft of an automobile.

They're different

kinds of crimes" (T. 122). The court's determination
disregarded the fact that both crimes Involve the same
intent, indeed theft can be a lesser included offense of
burglary.
In State v. Pitts. 728 P.2d 113 (Utah 1986), the
Supreme Court addressed the relationship between burglary
and theft in term3 of a lesser included instruction.

The

defendant argued the obvious relationship between burglary
and theft because burglary involves the element of intent
to commit theft.

The 3tate argued that different "societal

interests" mere protected at common law by each crime.
Pitts. 728 P.2d at 115. The Court held that:
The State'3 analysis Ignores the plain language
of section 76-6-202(1), which includes the intent
8

to commit a theft in the definition of "burglary,"
. , . A significant relationship exists between
these two offenses because the same specific
intent 13 required for each. The fact that the
intent to commit theft is not a necessary element
of all burglaries does not obviate the relationship between the two offenses in this case.
Pitts.728 P.2d at 116.
In addition to the fact that they are legally similar
crimes; in the minds of the average person or juror, they
are similar as they both Involve stealing.

In fact the

Supreme Court has characterized prior convictions for
retail theft and attempted burglary as "stealing-type
crimes."

State v. Bruce. 779 P.2d 646 at 656 (Utah 1989).

Despite the trial court's view, burglary is exactly the
type of prior conviction that would make a juror conclude
that defendant is guilty of theft, l.e, if he broke In some
place and stole and kept other people's property before, he
probably stole the car and was going to keep it too.

This

is particularly important given the significance of the
intent issue; likely led the jury to determine that he
intended to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle
(keep the car) because he's a thief.
While the court initially correctly found that
burglary "is not a crime of testimonial dishonesty or false
statement.
609 ..."

That comes in no matter what under Rule
(T. 121). The court then basically treated it

as such a crime:
9

the crime of burglary is one that indicates—It's
on the—it's on the range of those that indicate
a willingness to depart from the standards of
society. It's—it's the kind of crime that—that
involves oftentimes, some sort o f — t h e use of
subterfuge, it's done at night or it's done when
people are unaware. It's kind of a — f o r lack of
a better word, kind of a sneaky crime.
(T. 121). The Court also found that "if he has done
something in the past that indicates a willingness to
depart from the standards of society, that may also mean
that he's milling to depart from the standards of society
by not telling the truth when he's on the witness stand"
(T. 121).
However, the Supreme Court has held that absent a
showing that a prior burglary was committed by fraudulent
or deceitful means bearing directly on the accused's
likelihood to testify truthfully, it is not a crime of
dishonesty or false statement and absent that showing,
burglary does not "involve the credibility-deteriorating
quality contemplated in the rule" [Rule 609(a)(2)].
779 P.2d at 656.

Bruce.

Absent that showing, a burglary

conviction does not "bear directly on the likelihood that
defendant will testify truthfully."

Bruce., at 656 quoting

United States v. Glenn. 667 F.2d 1269, 1273 (9th Cir.
1982).

In the present case there was absolutely no showing

that the prior burglary mas committed by such fraudulent or

10

deceitful means which mould bear on defendant's
credibiIity.
Clearly the court's treatment of the burglary
conviction unfairly impacted the defendant in light of the
fact that the main rationale for admitting the conviction
relied upon by both the prosecutor and court was that the
conviction went directly to defendant's credibility.
After reviewing record, there is a reasonable
likelihood that the result would have been different had
defendant's prior conviction been excluded.

The burglary

conviction would be extremely prejudicial and tend to
inflame the jury in a case involving a theft or stealingtype crime.

Defendant's testimony would have been more

believable and influential had his credibility not been
damaged by the prejudicial errors.
2.

The Trial Court Erred In Not Requiring
Prosecutor To fleet His Burden of
Establishing the Probativeness of the
Burglary Convict ion.

"It i3 universally held that the prosecution under
Rule 609(a)(1) has the burden of persuading the court that
the probative value of admitting the convictions, as far as
shedding light on the defendant's credibility, outweighs
the prejudicial effect to the defendant."
at 1334.

Banner. 717 P.2d

Because other crimes evidence under rule

609(a)(1) is presumed inadmissible, a trial court cannot
abdicate its responsibility to determine the evidence's
11

probativene33, State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah
1991). fl3 stated supra, the determination of probativenes3
basically rested on the flamed suggestion that the burglary
conuiction bore directly on defendant's credibility, fls
di3cu33ed, 3upra, the crime of burglary does not inherently
reflect on defendant'3 character for truth and veracity,
Banner, 717 P.2d at 1334-35.
During the state's case-in-chief, no evidence of
defendant'3 prior crimes wa3 admitted, other than Brewer's
parole comment (see infra Point II). Subsequently,
defendant testified on hi3 own behalf.

During direct

defendant testified that he took the vehicle without
permission and that he intended to return it (T. 107)
During cross-examination defendant was asked mhether he had
been convicted of a felony and answered yes (T. 116).
Defense counsel objected and the jury was excused (T. 116)
and the court proceeded to consider the admissibility of
the prior crime evidence (T. 117-122).

The prior

conuictions were objected to on the basis of Section 76-81002 (T. 116-17).

Said objection was denied (T. 117-18).

The court then conducted a rule 609 analysis (T. 118-22).
The burden of establishing probativeness is on the
prosecution. Banner. 717 P.2d at 1334.

The trial court

recognized the burden but did not require the prosecutor to
meet it.

Mr. Benge offered virtually no evidence that

introduction of the conviction would be more probative than
prejudicial.
12

rir. Benge: Vour honor, I just think that it — i t
— i t just goes to the issue of his credibility,
and the prejudicial factor, l~l can't say, I
guess I'd leave that up to Sandra to argue, but
it certainly, to me, if I were sitting on a jury,
I would want to know if this person were a sweet
innocent or if h e — h e had some reason to be
fabricating this story.
(T, 120).
fls in Banner where the Utah Supreme Court found
reversible error, the prosecutor In the instant case did
not argue that the evidence of the felony conviction was
more probative than prejudicial (T. 120). In fact he relied
more on the prejudicial nature of it.
Ms. Starley: His credibility, though, is a very
important issue, and I think that it will be
compromised by admitting the felony conviction.
Mr. Benge: I agree that it would be compromised
and that's the exact reason we're trying to get
it

in.

(T. 120-21).
The harmfulness of the error must next be considered.
The credibility of defendant was central to his case as
defendant did not deny his involvement, rather he denied
having the intent to deprive the owner of "permanent"
possession of the vehicle.
During closing argument, the prosecutor repeatedly
discussed the defendant's credibility and stated:

13

Rnd I want to ask you: Do you believe llr.
Gauger? If you believe fir. Gauger, then perhaps
you should find the defendant guilty to the
unlawful control of a motor vehicle for an
extended time, and that's your prerogative; but
do you belive him? Did he intend to return that
car? No. . . .
Is a person to be believed mho had a phony
I.D, on him, identifying him as Charles Cox? Rnd
is a person to be believed mho's a convicted
felon.
fls the Judge stated, the fact that he's a
convicted felon, in and of itself, is not anything that means that you have to completely
disrely, or disregard his testimony; but that,
combined with everything else, I ask you, do you
believe him? Or was it just too darn easy to
say that?
Would he have said the same thing if he were
caught in three days and said, Oh, I meant to
take it back, I was going to take It back tomorrow, and then the next day, I was going to go
and get the money and take it down. Or two week3
later. It's too darn easy to explain yourself
away after you get caught. . . .
Do you believe fir. Gauger? If you do, find
him guilty of the crime in Instruction 6,
unlawful control over the motor vehicle for an
extended time. If you don't find him guilty as
charged.
(T.157-58).
The motive for the state to admit the conviction was
to show that defendant is a bad person and should not be
14

believed.
trial.

That is exactly how the conviction mas used at

The conviction was used to show criminal

disposition as prohibited in Sounders, in effect arguing to
the jury that defendant Is a criminal so he must have
committed the crime at issue.
In the present case, the impermissible analysis mas
urged, as stated above, by the prosecutor's argument that
defendant is a convicted felon, "do you believe him?" (T.
158).

These comments and the other listed supra, clearly

urged the jury to view defendant as a person who commits
crimes and to use this characteristic as evidence that he
committed the charged crime.

This is especially

prejudicial in a less than strong case.
Defendant's case rested on the jury's assessment of
the believabiIity of his claim that he intended to return
the vehicle.

The prosecutor referred to defendant's prior

criminal involvement during cross-examination and closing
argument.

Under these circumstances, it "is impossible to

say that defendant's substantial rights were not affected
by the (trial court's) error."

Banner. 717 P.2d at 1334.

"In close cases, the substantive use of a prior conviction
can often tilt the balance in favor of conviction,
particularly in the instant case, where (defendant's)
character is at the heart of his defense."
State v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992).

15

B.

The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error
in Concluding that Defendant's Felony
Conviction was Admissible Despite Section
76-8-1002(2), Utah Code Annotated.

The relevant procedure for a felony jury trial with an
habitual criminal charge is 03 follows:

"If a jury is

impaneled, it shall not be told of the previous felony
convictions or charge of being a habitual criminal.

The

trial on the felony committed within the state of Utah
shall proceed as in other cases."

Section 76-8-1002(2)

Utah Code. flnn. 1953, as amended.
Defendant objected to the admission of his prior
convictions under 76-8-1001,et seq. and the following
exchange and analysis followed:
Us. Star ley: Vour honor, under the habitual
criminal code section, 78-8-101 (sic) it states
that any crime that is, or conviction that is
relied upon to charge the defendant mith habitual
criminal cannot be brought up to the jury.
find I believe from my review of his criminal
history that all his felony convictions would
have—would come under that. I believe all of
them have been listed on the Information as the
ones that the state is relying upon.
fir. Benge: I tend to agree with the fact that I
couldn't bring it up to the jury without—without
his denying it; however, I still believe—I don't
think that obviates my ability to ask him, for
credibility purposes, whether he's been convicted
of a felony and what felony and when.

16

The Court: Uell, I interpret that provision a s —
as meaning nothing more than that during the
trial on the underlying charge, where habitual
criminal is—is also charged, that—that the jury
will not receive information a3 to the prior
convictions with regard to the habitual criminal
charge, 30 that—so there's no crosscontamination there.
I don't interpret that a s — a s meaning that
the rules that would ordinarily apply for introduction of felony convictions to impeach a
witness would—would be abrogated, so I think
t h o s e — those rules a r e — t h e application of Rule
609 or Rule 404(b) are not affected, not
intended to be affected by that statute, and a
reasonable reading of it, they would not be
affected.
So they're certainly not admissible to show
that he'3 a habitual criminal at this stage; but
if they're admissible for purposes of credibility
when he takes the stand, they'd be admissible on
the 3ame ba3i3 as in any other case, where—if
they were admissible to show anything else under
Rule 404(b).
(T. 116-18).
The Court's and prosecution analysis while relying on
an allegedly "reasonable reading" of the statute is flawed,
fl plain reading of the statute is that the jury is not to
be told of the prior felony convictions (referring to the
felony convictions specified in the information and relied
upon for the habitual charge) or the habitual charge.

If

that section only meant that the prior felony convictions
could not be mentioned unless admissible under a Rule 404
17

or 609 analysis then the questioned language would be
clearly superfluous and unnecessary, as a statute that said
only that jury should not be told of the habitual charge
would have the 3ame effect, It appears that the legislature
ha3 chosen to require a different standard regarding prior
convictions in case3 where the prosecutor alleges the
defendant to be a habitual criminal.
Uhile this issue appears to be a case of first
impression in Utah, defendant urges a plain reading of the
statute as outlined supra.
The same analysis of harm as discussed supra in
section fl applies to this error.

Clearly the admission of

the prior conviction substantially affected the jury's
verdict,

l-lithout said admission there is a reasonable

likelihood of a more favorable verdict for defendant.
POINT II
The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error by
Refusing to Grant Defendant a Mistrial on the
Ground that Brewer's Testimony i»a3 Prejudicial.
fl trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial will
be upheld unless the court abused its discretion.

To

warrant reversal defendant must 3how that testimony is so
prejudicial as to deny him a fair trial. State v. Burk.
839 P.2d 880, 883-84 (Utah Rpp. 1992).

"In the absence of

the appearance of something persuasive to the contrary, we
assume that the jurors were conscientious in performing to
their duty, and that they followed the instructions of the
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court."

Burk. 839 P.2d at 883 quoting State v, Hodges. 517

P.2d 1322, 1324 (Utah 1974).
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial;
If it has a tendency to influence the outcome of
the trial by improper means, or if it appeals to
the jury's sympathies, or arouses its sense of
horror, provokes its instinct to punish or otherwise causes a jury to base its decision on something other than the established propositions of
the case.
Burk. 839 P.2d at 883, quoting Terry v. Zions

COOP.

Hercantile Inst.. 605 P.2d 314, 323 n. 31 (Utah 1979).

The

parole comment clearly was inadmissible and unfairly
prejudicial under the above standard.

Hearing the the

defendant has been in prison arouses the jury's sense of
horror and provokes its instinct punish and causes a jury
to base its decision on a non-established proposition of
the case.

The statement most likely had a strong impact on

the jury as most people feel that a person has to do a lot
or something really bad to be sent to prison.

Also, the

average person feels that someone mho has gone to prison,
gets out and then is involved mith the police again, needs
to be locked up for a long time.
The impact of "the testimony might be compared to a
drop of ink placed in a vessel of milk.

It cannot long be

seen, but it surely remains there to pollute its contents."
Pearce v. Uistisen, 701 P.2d 489 at 494 (Utah 1985).
light of the admission the burglary conviction and the
19

In

inherent prejudicial nature of the mention of prison while
the jury would probably try to disregard the comment but
would find it impossible to ignore it in a case where the
prosecution relied so heavily on discrediting the
defendant.
In the closest case in point, State v. Uelarde. a
three day murder trial, a state witness stated he knew
defendant "in jail".
(Utah 1986).

State v. Uelarde, 734 P.2d 440 at 448

Defense counsel objected, uias overruled and

the court denied the motion for mistrial.

Court held that

prejudice was involved, but that prejudice must be unfair.
The court held that a "single phrase, clearly elicited
inadvertently, made during a three-day trial . . . would be
treated as harmless error absent a showing that it had a
substantial influence in bringing about the verdict."
Uelarde. 734 P.2d at 448.
The present case differs from Uelarde. for while the
parole statement was a single phrase, the trial was
concluded in less than a full day, and in conjunction with
the admission of his prior felony conviction, it clearly
had a substantial impact on the jury, fl reference to
prison is much more prejudicial than a reference to jail.
Such a comment is especially influential in a case where
defendant's credibility and intent are the ultimate issue
and defendant's right to a fair trial is also impacted by
admission of a prior conviction.
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POINT III
The Evidence Is Insufficient to Support
Defendant's Conviction for Theft of an Operable
flotor Uehicle.
The state produced insufficient evidence to establish
that defendant obtained unauthorized control over a motor
vehicle with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof as
required for a conviction for theft of an operable motor
vehicle.

The standard for review of such a claim is as

follows:
In dealing with a claim of insufficiency of
the evidence, "(T)he evidence and the reasonable
inferences which might be drawn therefrom must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury
verdict. R jury conviction is reversed for
insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable mind3 must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted."
State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141, 1147

(Utah 1989) accord

State v. Jonas. 793 P.2d 902, 905 (Utah flpp. 1990).
Uiewing the evidence in light most favorable to the
verdict, there is evidence that defendant had unauthorized
control of the vehicle, that the defendant did not return
the vehicle within 24 hours after the exercise of
unauthorized control which satisfies the elements of the
lesser included offense of unauthorized control O V P " a
motor vehicle for an extenJed time.
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Htnever, there is no

substantial euidence that defendant had purpose to deprive
a required element for theft of an operable vehicle.

The

evidence is inconclusive and improbable to support the
conviction.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401 defines purpose to deprive
and list three circumstances in uihich purpose to deprive
may be found as an element of theft under § 76-6-404.

In

the instant case, the jury instruction given listed all
three opt ions.
(3) "Purpose to deprive" mean3 to have the conscious
object:
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so
extended a period or to use under such circumstances
that a substantial portion of Its economic value, or
of the use and benefit thereof, mould be lost; or
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of
a reward or other compensation; or
(c) To dispose of the property under
circumstances that make it unlikely that the owner
will recover it.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-401(3).

The State did not Introduce

sufficient evidence showing that defendant's acts satisfied
the statutory definition of purpose to deprive.
The prosecutor acknowledged that it is unknown whether
defendant acted with purpose to deprive.
happen?

"Uell, did this

Uell, in a way, we really don't know"

(T. 143).

He went on to state the things that might have happened,
had the vehicle not been recovered uihen it was.

This

argument was on basec on conjecture and speculation.

The

only conclusive and logical evidence the jury could rely
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upon mas defendant's initial statements and a commonsense
evaluation of the fact that from the first moment defendant
mas asked about the uehicle (a time where he wasn't in a
very good position to come up with a story, having just
been discovered hiding under a bed) he stated that he
intended to leave the vehicle to a place where it mas
likely to be recovered.

That testimony directly counters

the element of purpose to depriue argued by prosecutor,
that of disposing of the property under circumstances that
would make it unlikely that the owner mill recover it.
Also, the circumstances of defendant's use of vehicle
were inconsistent mith the intent or purpose to deprive.
Defendant drove the vehicle outside of Utah and returned in
it to floab and unloaded all his friend's possessions.

This

is consistent with the intent to use temporarily not the
intent to permanently depriue.

If defendant was going to

dispose of the uehicle in may that would make it unlikely
that it mould be recouered, he would not driue to another
state and then return to small tomn in a highly visible
vehicle (red camaro) that had most likely been reported as
stolen.
In fact the prosecutor acknowledged that the jury
couid find the defendant guilty of the lesser charge:

"you

sure as heck could find him guilty of unlawful control of a
motor uehicle ouer an extended period of time.

He did

exercise unauthorized control and he did not reiurn the
motor uehicle within 24 hours" (T. i44).
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The prosecutor misstated the "purpose to deprive"
element when he argued that the defendant "by his own
testimony, which you may believe or disbelieve, he never
intended to return the vehicle to the owner" (T. H 5 ) , The
required element, as cited supra, is not whether defendant
intended to return the vehicle directly to owner, but
whether the defendant intended to dispose of property under
circumstances that would make it unlikely to be recovered,
Defendant "by his own testimony" intended to dispose of the
property in a way that would make it likely to be
recovered,
Given the evidence presented in this case, defendant
is entitled to have his conviction reduced from theft of an
operable motor vehicle to unauthorized control of a motor
vehicle for an extended period and the case remanded to
trial court for resentencing.
CONCLUSION
The above discussed errors of the trial court in
conjunction with the insufficient evidence deprived the
defendant of his right to a fair trial.

Especially when

looked at as a whole, it is clear that defendant's
conviction should be reversed and the case remanded for a
new trial or the conviction reduced to unauthorized control
of motor vehicle for an extended time and the case remanded
for resentencing.
V*
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Respectfully submitted this

It

day of July, 1994.

L
Sandra U, Star ley
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIUERV
I do hereby certify that on the I t ^day of July,
1994, I mailed postage prepaid four true and accurate
copies of the the foregoing brief of appellant to:
Utah Attorney General
fippellate Division
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

1
Attorney for Defendant

25

ADDENDUM
Utah Code Annotated. Section 76-6-404. Theft-Elements.
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control
over the property of another with a purposes to deprive him thereof.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-8-1001. Habitual CriminalDetermination
Any person who has been twice convicted, sentenced, and committed
for felony offenses at least one of which offenses having been at least a
second degree felony or a crime which, if committed within this state would
have been a capital felony, first degree felony, or second degree felony, and
was committed to any prison may, upon conviction of at least a second
degree felony committted in this state, other than aggravated murder or
murder, be determined as a habitual crimnal and be imprisoned in the state
prison for from five years to life.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-8-1002. Habitual CriminalProcedure—Punishment.
(1) In charging a person with being a habitual criminal, the
(2) If the defendant is bound over to the district court for trial, the
county attorney or district attorney shall in the information or complaint
specify the felony committed within the state of Utah and the two or more
previous felony convictions relied upon for the charge of being a habitual
criminal. If a jury is impaneled, it shall not be told of the previous felony
convictions or charge of being a habitual cirmnal. The trial on the felony
committed within the state of Utah shall proceed as in other cases.
(3) If the court or jury finds the defendant guilty of the felony
charged, then the defendant shall be tried immediately by the same judge or
jury, if a jury was impaneled, on the charge of being a habitual criminal,
unless the defendant has entered or enters a plea of guilty to the charge of
being a habitual criminal.
(4) No conviction may be admissible to establish the status of a
habitual criminal if it was set aside on the basis of the defendant's innocence.
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime.
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
i, 1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, the crime
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under
the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an
accused has been convicted of such a cirme s>.all be admitted if the court
?.

determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
Rule 26(2)(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from:
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea.
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken.
UJ Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may
be taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court to the appellate court with
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as
otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate
court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other
sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-1-6. Rights of defendant.
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(f)
Court of Appeals jurisdiction
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony.
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